YGN Ethical Hacker Group Blog

1. OVERVIEW Acuity CMS 2.6.x (ASP-based) versions are vulnerable to Arbitrary File Upload. 2. BACKGROUND Acuity CMS is a powerful but simple, extremely easy to use, low priced, easy to deploy content management system. It is a leader in its price and feature class. 3. VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION Acuity CMS 2.6.x (ASP-based) version contain a flaw that may allow an attacker to upload .asp/.aspx files without restrictions, which will execute ASP(.Net) codes. The issue is due to the script, /admin/file_manager/file_upload_submit.asp , not properly sanitizing 'file1', 'file2', 'file3', 'fileX' parameters. 4. VERSIONS AFFECTED Tested with version 2.6.2. 5. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT/EXPLOIT [REQUEST] POST /admin/file_manager/file_upload_submit.asp HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost Cookie: ASPSESSIONID=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX -----------------------------6dc3a236402e2 Content-Disposition: form-data; name="path" /images ----------------------...

1. OVERVIEW Acuity CMS 2.6.x (ASP-based) versions are vulnerable to Path Traversal. 2. BACKGROUND Acuity CMS is a powerful but simple, extremely easy to use, low priced, easy to deploy content management system. It is a leader in its price and feature class. 3. VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION The issue is due to the script, /admin/file_manager/browse.asp, not properly sanitizing user input, specifically directory traversal style attacks (e.g., ../../) supplied via the 'path' parameter. It would allow the attacker to access arbitrary files outside of web root directory. 4. VERSIONS AFFECTED Tested with version 2.6.2. 5. PROOF-OF-CONCEPT/EXPLOIT http://localhost/admin/file_manager/browse.asp?field=&form=&path=../../ 6. SOLUTION The Acunity CMS is no longer in active development. It is recommended to user another CMS in active development and support. 7. VENDOR The Collective http://www.thecollective.com.au/ 8. CREDIT Aung Khant, h...

A small perl script that checks a target server whether it is prone to BEAST vulnerability via target preferred cipher. It assumes no workaround (i.e. EMPTY FRAGMENT) applied in target server. Some sources said this workaround was disabled by default for compatibility reasons. This may be the reason why RC4 ciphersuite was widely chosen as highest preferred ciphersuite for the primary workaround. Download:  http://code.google.com/p/beast-check/downloads/detail?name=beast.pl $ ./ beast . pl =============================================== SSL / TLS BEAST Vulnerability Check   by YGN Ethical Hacker Group , http : //yehg.net/ =============================================== Usage : beast . pl host [ port ] port = 443 by default { optional } $ ./ beast . pl www . hotmail . com =============================================== SSL / TLS BEAST Vulnerability Check   by YGN Ethical Hacker Group , http : //yehg.net/ ==================================...

This demo shows how we could retrieve senstive data of a program through memory dump. We demonstrated it using a real-world application, pfingo 4.2. Sensitive data should always be encrypted in program memory once they have been pulled from external sources/user inputs. Note that malicious programs could do the same.  http://core.yehg.net/lab/pr0js/training/view/CWE-316_plaintext-storage-in-memory/